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Section 183 of the Internal Revenue Code:
The Need for Statutory Reform
[N]o sooner were the apparent leaks in the dike plugged than new ones
appeared.
-Remarks of Commissioner of Internal Revenue Jerome Kurtz, 1977'
INTRODUCTION
Taxpayer abuse of tax shelters2 has increased dramatically since the early
1970's.3 Despite prolonged efforts by the Treasury Department and Congress
to stop the abuse of these shelters, it continues to flourish.
4
. Address at the 30th Annual Federal Tax Conference of the University of Chicago Law
School (Oct. 26, 1977), reprinted in 55 TAXES 774 (1977).
2. The American Bar Association defines the term "tax shelter" as:
an investment which has as a significant feature for federal income or excise tax
purposes either or both of the following attributes: (1) deductions in excess of
income from the investment being available in any year to reduce income from
other sources in that year, and (2) credits in excess of the tax attributable to the
income from the investment being available in any year to offset taxes on income
from other sources in that year. Excluded from the term are investments such
as, but not limited to, the following: municipal bonds; annuities; ... and real
estate where it is anticipated that deductions are unlikely to exceed gross income
from the investment in any year, and that any tax credits are unlikely to exceed
the tax on the income from that source in any year.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 (revised) (1982),
reprinted in 68 A.B.A. J. 471, 471 n.l (1982). Congress, however, defines a "tax shelter" as:
(I) a partnership or other entity,
(11) any investment plan or arrangement, or
(III) any other plan or arrangement, if the principal purpose of such partnership,
entity, plan, or arrangement is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax.
I.R.C. § 661(b)(2)(C)(ii) (1982). Finally, Professor George Cooper defines "tax shelters" as
"investments by individual taxpayers in amortizable assets or depletable property, under ar-
rangements that have been structured with care to produce favorable tax results for the investor,
using.., deferral, capital gains conversion, and leverage." Cooper, The Taming of the Shrewd:
Identifying and Controlling Income Tax Avoidance, 85 CoLuM. L. REV. 656, 667 (1985).
3. In 1973, there were only 400 tax shelter cases under investigation. In 1983, 325,000 tax
shelter cases were investigated. Abuse a Tax Shelter, Get an Audit, L.A. Times, Oct. 5, 1983,
§ IV, at 2, col. 1. The annual revenue loss from these shelters is estimated to be $3.5 billion.
I.R.S. to Widen Crackdown on Ta Cheats, L.A. Times, Apr. 7, 1983, § I, at 17, col. 1.
Roscoe L. Egger, the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, designates this type of tax
shelter an "abusive tax shelter." He differentiates between abusive and nonabusive shelters in
the following manner:
Nonabusive tax shelters involve transactions with legitimate economic reality,
where the economic benefits outweigh the tax benefits. Such shelters seek to defer
or minimize taxes.
Abusive tax shelters involve transactions with little or no economic reality, in-
flated appraisals, unrealistic allocations, etc., where the claimed tax benefits are
disproportionate to the economic benefits. Such shelters typically seek to evade taxes.
Egger, Warning: Abusive Tax Shelters Can Be Hazardous, 68 A.B.A. J. 1674, 1674 (1982).
See generally Note, Abusive Tax Shelters: Will the Latest Tools Really Help?, 57 S. CAL. L.
REv. 431, 431-32 (1984) (discusses the proliferation of abusive tax shelters and whether recent
Congressional and Treasury Department measures will be sufficient to combat the abuse).
4. According to an industry newsletter, taxpayers invested approximately $8.4 billion in
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The tax advantages of these shelters are enhanced by the application of
the "not engaged in for profit" test of section 183 of the Internal Revenue
Code.' Under section 183, if the taxpayer participates or invests in an activity
which is "not engaged in for profit," he is not allowed a deduction for any
expenses or losses attributable to that activity. 6 Yet whether an activity is
engaged in for profit is often difficult to determine because no clear judicial
or legislative standard exists. Since Congress enacted section 183 in 1969,1
courts have applied one of three different standards to determine whether
a taxpayer possessed the requisite profit motive."
The weakness of the "not engaged in for profit" test is readily apparent
when examining the application of section 183 to limited partnerships9 formed
to invest in intellectual or artistic property.' 0 The limited partnership pur-
chases the work of art, be it a film, video, book, or master recording, by
advancing a nominal amount of cash and securing the balance of the purchase
price with a nonrecourse note." As a result of his initial outlay, the taxpayer
receives immediate and substantial payments in the form of tax savings,'
2
which often may equal or exceed his initial investment. 3
tax advantaged investments (limited partnerships registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission) in 1983, compared to approximately $5.5 billion in 1982. ROBERT A. STANGER
AND COMPANY, THE STANGER REPORT (1984).
5. All section citations hereinafter are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (I.R.C.) as
amended.
6. See infra note 18.
7. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 213(a), 83 Stat. 571 (1969) (codified
at I.R.C. § 183 (1982)).
8. See infra notes 41-57 and accompanying text.
9. This Note focuses on cases involving limited partnerships to highlight the deficiencies
in the application and structure of section 183 of the Code. With the passage of the new Tax
Reform Act, however, it is probable that the use of limited partnerships as tax shelters will
diminish. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., SUMMARY OF
CONFERENCE AGREEMENT ON H.R. 3838 (TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986) (West 1986). Changes in
the at-risk rules, interest deduction limitation, and limitations on losses and credits from passive
activities will combine to make the use of limited partnership tax shelters less appealing. See
PRENTIcE-HALL INFORMATION SERVICES, TAX IDEAS, PRENTICE-HALL'S EXPLANATION OF THE TAX
REFORM ACT OF 1986 501-17 (October 1, 1986). It is likely, however, that individual taxpayer
abuse of section 183 will increase in the near future.
10. Tax shelters involving fine art have become quite commonplace. William Noe, President
of the Resource Development Corporation and New Masters, Inc., an organization that packages
tax shelters, states that "any reproductive art with an element of economic risk is suitable for
a tax shelter. These include motion pictures, records, television tapes, books, ceramics, or
anything else that requires a master plate, film, mold, or die." Maindenberg, Tax Shelters in
OriginalArt, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1979, § 3, at 2, col. 3. See also L. DEBoFF, THE DESKBOOK
OF ART LAW 1984 SUPPLEMENT XIV 20-29 (1984) (discussing fine art investments as tax shelters);
R. TANNEHAUSER & C. TANNEHAUSER, TAX SHELTERS: A COMPLETE GUIDE 21-27 (1978) (dis-
cussing various investments as tax shelters).
11. A nonrecourse debt is a debt in which the borrower is not personally liable. Upon
default the lender looks only to the underlying secured property for satisfaction. Real property
may be acquired by incurring a nonrecourse debt when (1) a third party lends purchase funds
and secures the debt with the purchased property; (2) the vendee assumes or takes subject to
an existing mortgage. Note, Federal Income Tax Treatment of Nonrecourse Debt, 82 COLUM.
L. REV. 1498, 1498 n.1 (1982).
12. See, e.g., infra notes 67-85 and accompanying text.
13. Id. A $3,000 investment netted Fox $11,345 in tax deductions.
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Part I of this Note examines the various court-manufactured standards
for determining whether an individual 4 is engaged in an activity for profit,
and it finds them all unsatisfactory. Part II then evaluates section 183 in
light of recent Tax Court decisions and argues that the current legal standards
contained within the statutory framework are inadequate, particularly when
applied to investments in intellectual and artistic property. Finally, Part III
concludes that section 183 leaves too much to judicial discretion and intuition.
It suggests that an equitable and efficient solution can ultimately be achieved
only through legislative reform of section 183.
I. THE LEGAL STANDARDS
A. The Statute.
In 1969 Congress enacted section 183 of the Internal Revenue Code' 5 as
a replacement for Code section 270.16 The new statute was intended to deal
with taxpayers who used losses from hobby activities to offset income from
other sources. 7 Section 183,l8 which applies to individuals, trusts, estates,
14. In Rev. Rul. 77-320, 1977-2 C.B. 78, the Treasury asserted that § 183 applies to the
activities of partnerships and that its provisions should be applied at the partnership level and
reflected in the partners' distributive shares. The United States Court of Appeals for the 11 th
Circuit affirmed the Treasury's stance in its decision in Brannen v. Comm'r, 722 F.2d 695
(lth Cir. 1984): "Since the partnership is treated as an entity distinct from its partners, it
would be inconsistent to examine profit motive on a partner rather than a partnership level.
Accordingly, this Court [holds that] the profit test should be applied at the partnership level."
Id. at 704. Accord Deegan v. Comm'r, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 1421, 1429 (1985), aff'd, 787 F.2d
825 (2d Cir. 1986); Hager v. Comm'r, 76 T.C. 759, 782 (1981); Van Raden v. Comm'r, 71
T.C. 1083, 1103 (1979), aff'd, 650 F.2d 1046 (9th Cir. 1981).
15. See supra note 7.
16. Section 183 was enacted as a replacement for I.R.C. § 270. Section 270 applied only
if an activity was engaged in for profit. It did not permit an individual to deduct losses in
excess of $50,000 when such excess losses had been incurred in any activity for five consecutive
years. Section 270 was ineffective for two reasons: (1) many deductions were excluded by statute
from the computation of loss, and (2) taxpayers could usually rearrange income and deductions
to defeat the five-year string. Furthermore, when § 270 did apply, it was overly harsh, requiring
the taxpayer to pay in one year the additional tax attributable to a five-year period. See S.
R P. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 102-03, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG;. & ADMIN.
NEWS 2027, 2134.
17. Section 183 was enacted out of a concern that taxpayers were often deducting hobby
losses, particularly hobby losses incurred in farming. The Treasury Department, the House,
and the Senate therefore all listed their provisions for the new § 183 under the general topic
of "Farm Losses." The House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee,
however, entitled their respective provisions "Hobby Losses." H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 62, 71, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1645, 1717; S. REP. No.
552, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 95, 102, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2027,
2133.
18. The relevant portions of § 183 provide:
§ 183. Activities not engaged in for profit
(a) General rule.-In the case of an activity engaged in by an individual or an
S corporation, if such activity is not engaged in for profit, no deduction attrib-
utable to such activity shall be allowed under this chapter except as provided in
this section.
(b) Deductions allowable.-In the case of an activity not engaged in for profit
1987]
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and subchapter S corporations, 19 affects only deductions from activities that
are "not engaged in for profit." Although deductions from these activities
are allowed, they are limited to the amount of gross income from the
respective activities. 20 Deductions allowed by other provisions that do not
require a profit motive do not fall within the scope of section 183 and thus
are not limited to the amount of gross income.21
Section 183 defines an "activity not engaged in for profit" as an activity
other than one for which deductions are allowable under section 162 or
under paragraphs (1) or (2) of section 212.22 Under section 162, 2 the ordinary
and necessary expenses of a trade or business qualify for deduction. In
to which subsection (a) applies, there shall be allowed-
(1) the deductions which would be allowable under this chapter for the taxable
year without regard to whether or not such activity is engaged in for profit, and
(2) a deduction equal to the amount of the deductions which would be
allowable under this chapter for the taxable year only if such activity were engaged
in for profit, but only to the extent that the gross income derived from such
activity for the taxable year exceeds the deductions allowable by reason of par-
agraph (1).
(c) Activity not engaged in for profit defined.-For purposes of this section,
the term "activity not engaged in for profit" means any activity other than one
with respect to which deductions are allowable for the taxable year under section
162 or under paragraph (1) or (2) of section 212.
(d) Presumption.-If the gross income derived from an activity for 2 or more
of the taxable years in the period of 5 consecutive taxable years which ends with
the taxable year exceeds the deductions attributable to such activity (determined
without regard to whether or not such activity is engaged in for profit), then,
unless the Secretary establishes to the contrary, such activity shall be presumed
for purposes of this chapter for such taxable year to be an activity engaged in
for profit. In the case of an activity which consists in major part of the breeding,
training, showing, or racing of horses, the preceding sentence shall be applied by
substituting the period of 7 consecutive taxable years for the period of 5 consecutive
taxable years.
19. I.R.C. § 183(a) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.183-1(a) (1972).
20. I.R.C. § 183(a), (b) (1982). The order in which the deductions may be taken is described
in Treas. Reg. § 1.183-1(b) (1972).
21. I.R.C. § 183(a), (b) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.183-1(a), (b) (1972).
22. I.R.C. § 183(c) (1982). The standard for determining whether an activity is "not engaged
in for profit" is the same whether the expenses would be deductible under § 162 or § 212. See
Appley v. Comm'r, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 386, 394 (1979); Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(a) (1972).
23. I.R.C. § 162 (1982). The relevant portions of § 162 provide:
§ 162. Trade or business expenses
(a) In general.-There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any
trade or business, including-
(1) a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal
services actually rendered;
(2) traveling expenses (including amounts expended for meals and lodging
other than amounts which are lavish or extravagant under the circumstances) while
away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business; and
(3) rentals or other payments required to be made as a condition to the
continued use or possession, for purpose of the trade or business of property to




addition, section 21224 permits deduction of ordinary and necessary expenses
incurred for the production or collection of an individual's income. As a
result, the definition of an "activity not engaged in for profit" in section
183 is no more than a reiteration of the general principles concerning the
deductibility of business or profit-oriented expenses. 25 Other relevant factors
used to determine whether an activity is engaged in for profit are contained
in the legislative history and regulations. 26
Section 183 creates a rebuttable presumption that an activity is "engaged
in for profit. '27 If the activity has been profitable for two of the last five
years (two of the last seven years for activities related to horses), then absent
a government showing to the contrary, the deduction is not limited to the
amount of gross income from the activity.
28
24. I.R.C. § 212 (1982) may be thought of as a rough equivalent of § 162 for expenses of
profit-seeking activities that are not part of a trade or business. Section 212 provides:
§ 212. Expenses for production of income
In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction all the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year-
(1) for the production or collection of income;
(2) for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for
the production of income; or
(3) in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax.
25. Under I.R.C. § 162 and § 212, the deduction is intended to so apply, if the activity is
engaged in for profit. S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 95, 103 reprinted in 1969 U.S.
CODE CONO. & ADMIN. NEws 2027, 2134. Case law reflects some confusion as to what the
appropriate degree of profit motive must be to have an activity classified as "engaged in for
profit." For example, it is not clear whether profit motive has to be the dominant intent, at
least a substantial motive, or merely one of the taxpayer's motives. See, e.g., Examination Tax
Shelters Handbook, [I Audit] Internal Revenue Man. (CCH) 7299-7, at 873 (June 27, 1985)
(at issue is whether a transaction fails the "profit motive" test if the prospective nontax return
is not at least as high as the going rate of return on risk free investments); Rice's Toyota
World, Inc. v. Comm'r, 81 T.C. 184, 202, 209 (1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 752 F.2d
89 (4th Cir. 1985) (at issue is whether the potential of a nontax return influences the taxpayer);
Surloff v. Comm'r, 81 T.C. 210, 233 (1983) (at issue is whether a nontax return is the primary
goal of taxpayer); Hilton v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 305, 353 n.23, 355-56 (1980), aff'd per curiam,
671 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 907 (1982) (at issue is whether the prospective
nontax return must be at least as great as the discount rate used by the Internal Revenue
Service in its annuity tables); Ginsburg v. Comm'r, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 860, 868 (1976) ("profit
motives" test is whether there is any potential nontax return at all). See Carey & Gallagher,
Requisite Greed: The Section 183 Regulations, 19 Loy. L. REv. 41 (1972-73).
26. See infra notes 29-40 and accompanying text.
27. I.R.C. § 183(d) (1982). See supra note 18.
28. If the taxpayer has engaged in the activity for less than 5 years (7 years for a horse-
related activity), he may elect that a determination of whether the presumption applies not be
made before the end of the fourth year (sixth year for a horse-related activity) following the
first year that he engaged in the activity. Otherwise, the presumption cannot apply until after
the second profitable year. I.R.C. § 183(e)(1) (1982). If made, the election extends the statute
of limitations for deficiencies related to the activity. I.R.C. § 183(e)(4) (1982). The Tax Reform
Act will amend § 183(d) so that an activity is presumed to be operated for a profit, rather
than as a hobby, if it is profitable in three out of five years. Horse breeding, training, showing,
and racing is presumed to be operated for profit if profitable in two out of seven consecutive
years. Prentice-Hall Information Services, supra note 9, at 135, 130.
19871
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B. The Regulations
Under the regulations to section 183, a taxpayer must have the "objective
of making a profit ' 29 in order for an activity to be classified as carried on
for profit.3 0 The regulations, however, do not explicitly state whether any
profit motive is sufficient, or whether the objective of making a profit must
be a substantial, or even the primary purpose for engaging in the activity.',
29. Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(a) (1972).
30. The term "profit" is not defined in the Code. Prior to the adoption of § 183, the
Treasury recommended that the "reasonably anticipated profit be an economic profit, not a
'tax savings' profit." TREAS. DEPT., 91ST CONG., IST SESS., TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM OF
TREASURY POSITION ON H.R. 1327035 (Comm. Print 1969). By contrast, the Senate Finance
Committee only wanted to limit the disallowance of deduction for losses under § 183 to cases
in which it was "generally appropriate." S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 103-04, reprinted
in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2027, 2134. In their final form, the regulations did
not stipulate that profit mean economic profit.
31. The bill passed by the House of Representatives in 1969 would have required a reasonable
expectation of profit. The Senate Finance Committee, however, rejected this requirement, stating
that:
The committee is concerned, however, that requiring a taxpayer to have a "rea-
sonable expectation" of profit may cause losses to be disallowed in situations
where an activity is being carried on as a business rather than as a hobby.
Accordingly, the committee has modified the House bill to provide that in de-
termining whether losses from an activity are to be allowed, the focus is to be
on whether the activity is engaged in for profit rather than whether it is carried
on with a reasonable expectation of profit. This will prevent the rule from being
applicable to situations where many would consider that it is not reasonable to
expect an activity to result in a profit even though the evidence available indicates
that the activity actually is engaged in for profit. For example, it might be argued
that there was not a "reasonable" expectation of profit in the case of a bona
fide inventor or a person who invests in a wildcat oil well. A similar argument
might be made in the case of a poor person engaged in what appears to be an
inefficient farming operation. The committee does not believe that this provision
should apply to these situations or that the House intended it to so apply, if the
activity is engaged in for profit.
S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 103, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODECONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 2027, 2133.
Case law reflects some confusion as to what the appropriate degree of profit motive must
be to have an activity classified as engaged in for profit. For example, it is not clear whether
profit motive has to be the dominant intent, at least a substantial motive, or merely one of
the taxpayer's motives. See, e.g., Examination Tax Shelters Handbook, [I Audit] Internal
Revenue Man. (CCH) 7299-7, at 873 (June 27, 1985), (suggesting that a transaction fails the
"profit motive" test if the prospective nontax return is not at least as high as the going rate
of return on risk free investments); Hilton, 74 T.C. at 353 n.23, 355-56 (suggesting that the
prospective nontax return must be a least as great as the discount rate used by the Internal
Revenue Service in its annuity tables); see also Dean v. Comm'r, 83 T.C. 56, 98 (1984) (at
issue is whether nontax return is an "actual and honest objective"); Estate of Baron, 83 T.C.
542, 558 (1984), aff'd, 798 F.2d 65 (2nd Cir. 1986) (at issue is whether the amount of potential
nontax return is sufficiently large in relation to the tax benefits); Surloff v. Comm'r, 81 T.C.
210, 233 (1983) (at issue is whether nontax return is the primary goal of taxpayer); Ginsburg
v. Comm'r, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 860, 868 (1976) ("profit motive" test is whether there is any
potential nontax return at all). For an excellent theoretical analysis of the problem, see Samansky,
Hobby Loss or Deductible Loss: An Intractable Problem, 34 U. FLA. L. REv. 46, 55-60 (1981).
See also Carey & Gallagher, supra note 25; Rhodes, Hobby Losses - A New Challenge, 56
A.B.A. J. 893 (1970); Sharpe, New "Hobby Loss" Rule Is Tougher But "Engaged In For
Profit" Dilemma Remains, 32 J. TAX'N 289 (1970).
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The regulations do state that "[t]he determination of whether an activity is
engaged in for profit is to be made by reference to objective standards." 3 2
While the term "objective standards" is not defined, it normally means that
objective facts should give the court information concerning whether the
taxpayer had a reasonable expectation of achieving a profit. 3a Moreover,
according to the regulations a taxpayer's statement concerning his intent, a
subjective factor, will also be accorded some weight.14
The regulations list nine factors, derived from case law, 35 that are among
those to be taken into account "[i]n determining whether an activity is
engaged in for profit. ' 3 6 These factors are intended to be neither compre-
hensive nor determinative of the question. No single factor is considered
conclusive. The regulations further state that the determination of whether
a profit motive exists should not be made on the basis that the number of
factors which indicate a "for profit" activity exceed those which indicate a
"not for profit" activity.3 7 The nine factors are: (1) manner in which the
taxpayer carries on the activity, (2) expertise of the taxpayer or his advisors,
(3) time and effort expended by the taxpayer in carrying on the activity, (4)
expectation that assets used in the activity may appreciate in value, (5) success
of the taxpayer in carrying on other similar or dissimilar activities, (6)
taxpayer's history of income or losses with respect to the activity, (7) amount
of occasional profits from the activity, (8) financial status of the taxpayer,
and (9) elements of personal pleasure or recreation from the activity. 38
As stated earlier, the regulations require the taxpayer to have an objective
of making a profit if he is to be allowed deductions for losses attributable
to his activity.3 9 To determine whether he has the requisite profit motive,
one must necessarily examine the taxpayer's subjective intent. While the
profit motive is subjective, the factors used to determines its presence or
absence are predominantly objective.40
32. Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(a) (1972).
33. Objective facts would be those that are important to an average or reasonable person;
they would not include a particular person's idiosyncrasies. See Blum, Motive, Intent, and
Purpose in Federal Income Taxation, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 485, 498 (1967).
34. "In determining whether an activity is engaged in for profit, greater weight is given to
objective facts than to the taxpayer's mere statement of his intent." Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(a)
(1972).
35. See Lee, A Blend of Old Wines in a New Wine Skin: Section 183 and Beyond, 29 TAX
L. REV. 347, 390-97 (1974).
36. Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b) (1972).
37. Id. "The intention of the drafters was that the list be merely used as an aid in the
ultimate determination of the intention of the taxpayer." Lee, supra note 35, at 396. Any
implication that all factors are to be weighted equally, however, is not in accord with existing
case law. Id.
38. Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2 (1972). For a detailed discussion of the nine factors, see Lee,
supra note 35, at 397-444; Burns & Groomer, Effects of Section 183 on the Business/Hobby
Controversy, 58 TAxEs 195, 197-205 (1980).
39. Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(a) (1972).
40. Carey & Gallagher, supra note 25, at 69-70. It should be noted that the ninth factor
is not an "objective" fact.
1987]
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C. The Primary Purpose Standard
The standard applied under prior law was the primary purpose standard.
The primary purpose standard for determining whether a person is engaged
in a trade or business is "whether the taxpayer's primary purpose and
intention in engaging in the activity is to make a profit." ' 4' Although courts
commonly emphasize that the taxpayer must have a "predominant purpose"
of making a profit for the losses to be deductible, 42 they ordinarily decide
cases in a way that avoids comparing profit motive with other motives. 41 In
general, when a court holds for the government it finds that the taxpayer
did not have a predominant purpose of making a profit." By deciding the
question in this manner, the court does not reach the more difficult issue
of whether making a profit was the primary purpose of engaging in the
activity. When holding for the taxpayer, the court will either minimize
consideration of the taxpayer's personal pleasure or stress solely the manner
in which the activity was conducted. 4 The primary purpose standard, as a
result, is less helpful in determining the ultimate findings of fact than it is
a convenient conclusory label.
The primary purpose standard is also unsatisfactory because it cannot
adequately contend with mixed motive cases. 46 The personal pleasure that a
41. Snyder v. United States, 674 F.2d 1359, 1362 (10th Cir. 1982). In Snyder, the taxpayer,
a practicing attorney, began work on a photography book of the Colorado high country. After
investing a substantial sum of money into sophisticated photographic equipment and devoting
substantial time to taking pictures, Snyder sent letters to publishing houses soliciting their
interest in his book. Several publishers initially expressed an interest, but no one offered to
buy or publish the book. On his tax return Snyder claimed depreciation deductions and business
expenses attributable to his "nature photography" activity. The Commissioner disallowed the
deductions attributable to the photography book, as did the district court. On appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the lower court's decision was reversed
and remanded on the ground that the trial court's findings of fact were not sufficient to allow
the court of appeals to review properly the finding. In obiter dictum, the court suggested that
the trial judge determine whether the taxpayer's primary purpose and intention in engaging in
the activity was to make a profit. Id. at 1364. For other cases utilizing the "primary purpose"
standard, see Golanty v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 411, 425 (1979), aff'd, 647 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1981);
Allen v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 28, 33 (1979). Contra Dreicer v. Comm'r, 665 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir.
1981). See also Note, On Deducing a Deductible Loss: The Continuing Search for an Appropriate
Legal Standard in Dreicer v. Commissioner and Snyder v. United States, 15 CoNr. L. REV.
847, 852-53 (1983) (thorough analysis of the Snyder decision).
42. See Lee, supra note 35, at 389 n.134; Crouch, How Treasury's Final Regulations on
the New Hobby Loss Rules Operate, 38 J. TAX'N 184 (1973). But see Samansky, supra note
31, at 56 n.46.
43. Samansky, supra note 31, at 55-56. Samansky contends that when courts avoid com-
parisons they are in effect adopting an all or nothing approach. They are consequently also
able to sidestep the difficult issue of whether a partial deduction will be allowed under I.R.C.
§ 183 when the taxpayer's business purpose is not primary but is more than merely incidental.
Id.
44. See Hires v. Comm'r, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 342 (1980); Sealy v. Comm'r, 39 T.C.M.
(CCH) 847 (1980).
45. See Fisher v. Comm'r, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 398 (1980); Sparre v. Comm'r, 39 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1044 (1980).
46. For a detailed analysis of the weaknesses of the primary purpose standard with respect
to mixed motive cases, see Samansky, supra note 31, at 55-59.
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taxpayer receives from an activity will inarguably influence a court's decision
on the deductibility of losses.' 7 If the requisite motive of making a profit
exists, however, it is unclear why the additional motive of personal pleasure
should affect the deductibility of losses .4  It appears unjust to penalize a
taxpayer who, in addition to his objective of making a profit, also derives
enjoyment from his activity.
D. The Bona Fide Expectation Standard
Since section 183 was enacted, courts have generally disregarded the ap-
plication of the primary purpose standard and instead have stated that losses
are deductible if the taxpayer has a bona fide expectation and intention of
making or realizing a profit. 49 Given the difficulty in determining a person's
bona fide expectation, the courts have attempted to ascertain the taxpayer's
true "intent" by focusing mainly on profit objectives rather than profit
expectations.5 0 Since intent is deduced from conduct, the test asks nothing
more than whether the taxpayer is actively seeking a profit. The taxpayer's
most important task, therefore, is to act as if he intends to realize a profit."
Focusing exclusively on intent to make a profit in determining whether
losses should be deductible raises several problems.12 First, analyzing sub-
jective "intent" is too vague to be an effective standard. Second, an intent
47. Id. at 57. To some extent, the regulations require such a result: "[D]eductions are not
allowable under section 162 or 212 for activities which are carried on primarily as a sport,
hobby, or for recreation." Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(a) (1972). Further, "[t]he presence of personal
motives in carrying on of an activity may indicate that the activity is not engaged in for profit,
especially where there are recreational or personal elements involved." Id. at § 1.183-2(b)(9).
48. See, e.g., Shine, Some Tax Problems of Authors and Artists, 13 TAx L. REV. 439, 446
(1958) (discussion of the problem of mixing pleasure with business for authors and artists).
49. Dreicer v. Comm'r, 48 T.C.M. (P-H) 1533 (1979), rev'd, 665 F.2d 1291 (D.C. Cir.
1981). The Tax Court held that Dreicer's "activity of traveling around the world allegedly to
obtain material for a manuscript was an 'activity ... not engaged in for profit' within the
meaning of section 183(a), since he did not have a bona fide expectation of profit." Id. at
1542.
50. In theory, the bona fide expectation standard may be considered a more rigid test than
the primary purpose standard because it requires the taxpayer to show that he had both a bona
fide expectation and intention of making a profit from engaging in the activity.
51. In Churchman v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 696 (1977), the taxpayer, a prize-winning artist,
had been successful in art shows but had lost money for twenty years. Nonetheless, the court
stated that:
It is abundantly clear from her testimony and from the objective evidence that
petitioner is a most dedicated artist, craves personal recognition as an artist, and
believes that selling her work for a profit represents the attainment of such
recognition. Therefore, petitioner intends and expects to make a profit. For section
183 purposes, it seems to us irrelevant whether petitioner intends to make a profit
because it symbolizes success in her chosen career or because it is the pathway
to material wealth. In either case, the essential fact remains that petitioner does
intend to make a profit from her artwork and she sincerely believes that if she
continues to paint she will do so.
Id. at 702-03.
52. See Samansky, supra note 31, at 59-60.
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to make a profit may accompany an intent to gain personal pleasure or
enjoyment from the activity. Finally, in order to objectively determine whether
a taxpayer has the requisite subjective intent of making a profit, the courts
must examine the taxpayer's objective actions. Consequently, a well-advised
hobbyist could deduct losses simply by presenting good records and other
outward evidence of good business practices.53
E. The Actual and Honest Profit Objective
The difficulty of focusing on intent lead to the abandonment of the bona
fide expectation standard.14 The "actual and honest profit objective" stand-
ard, the approach that best reflects the language of the statute and its
regulations, is the standard currently used to determine whether an activity
is engaged in for profit.55 This standard is nonetheless unacceptable for
several reasons, most involving the inherent difficulties of analyzing subjec-
tive "intent." First, the standard fails to address the applicability of section
183 to persons who have either substantial or secondary profit motives. A
person might have a substantial profit objective that equals, or perhaps even
53. For example, tax specialists will often advise their "gentlemen farmer" clients to:
(1) Keep good financial records that are used throughout the year for decision-
making and planning purposes. Make certain that expenses related to the land
can be separated if necessary. (2) Before and throughout the years of operation
consult a number of experts. Obtain written advice and follow it. This should
also include information about available markets. (3) Devote considerable time
to the activity, especially to managerial and financial duties. (4) Avoid swimming
pools, tennis courts, etc., on the property. Keeping them separate from farm
operations does not remove their potential damages. (5) Hire qualified personnel
to do the things you cannot do competently. (6) Testify in court. Appear forthright,
honest, and knowledgeable about the operation and about the type of activity in
general. Some extras that should help: (1) Have a profit plan in writing and
update it periodically. (2) Keep nonfinancial records on the animals, crops, etc.
(3) Document extraordinary events that affect the operation. (4) Advertise fre-
quently in the manner appropriate to the activity. (5) Select and use a business
name. Register it when appropriate. (6) Implement some cost-cutting measure
when possible. (7) Periodically, obtain information about fair market values for
all assets used in the business. Warnings to the taxpayer are: (I) Anyone converting
from a hobby must be considerably more conscientious than anyone else. (2) Do
not continue unsuccessful methods. (3) Be careful about using the farm facilities
for socializing or attending functions related to the activity that cannot be justified
as good for business. (4) Be careful about arranging transactions to insure profits
occur. This may be held against you. (5) An expert witness may damage your
case. If all else fails, the taxpayer should either earn a profit or decide no profit
can be made and abandon the activity before the court date. While this may be
personally and financially objectionable to the owner, it may be the only action
that will convince the court that a profit motive did exist.
Burns & Groomer, supra note 38, at 206.
54. See supra note 49.
55. Dreicer v. Comm'r, 78 T.C. 642, 646 (1982), aff'd mem., 702 F.2d 1205 (D.C. Cir.
1983); accord Swigert v. Comm'r, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 992, 994 (1982); Bryson v. Comm'r, 44
T.C.M. (CCH) 602, 604 (1982); Tarutis v. Comm'r, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 48, 53-54 (1982).
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surpasses, a desire for personal pleasure. Section 183 should not prevent loss
deductions because of a coexisting enjoyment motive. 56 By contrast, a tax-
payer may actually and honestly desire a profit but be unwilling to work
for it. Section 183 deductions should not be permitted merely because a
person entertains a hope of making a profit.
Second, because the court must examine a taxpayer's objective actions to
determine if he has the subjective intent of making a profit, a well-advised
taxpayer could deduct hobby losses by merely going through business-like
motions. 57 By disguising the true motive of his transaction, the taxpayer can
greatly alter his tax liability.
Although the "actual and honest profit objective" standard most closely
mirrors the language of the statute and its regulations, it fails to deal with
the practical and theoretical problems that the courts face in implementing
the statute. The standard, as a result, has little value.
II. RECENT SECTION 183 CASES
Courts often invoke section 183's "not engaged in for profit" language
to disallow a taxpayer's share of partnership losses."' Particularly trouble-
some for taxpayers, tax shelter promoters, and their respective legal counsel
has been the inability of the courts to promulgate a concise, unambiguous
legal standard. Although the regulations to section 183 purport to give some
guidance,5 9 judges have not applied them in a consistent manner. While some
judges openly express their reliance upon them,60 others only make passing
reference to them, 6' leaving it to the reader to decide whether and to what
extent the factors weighed in the court's decision. Moreover, in a recent Tax
Court case,62 the judge declined to rely upon any of the nine factors, relying
instead on the "facts and circumstances ' 63 of the particular situation. This
judicial vacillation serves only to perpetuate the opportunities for tax ex-
ploitation by resourceful promoters and skillful attorneys.
56. But see Note, supra note 41, at 860 (author argues that a taxpayer's enjoyment of an
activity should affect the deductibility of losses because the taxpayer is "better off" than a
person who loses money in an activity that he or she does not enjoy).
57. See supra note 53.
58. See, e.g., Deegan v. Comm'r, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 1421, 1429 (1985), aff'd, 787 F.2d
825 (2d Cir. 1986) (partnership's acquisition and exploitation of movie not an activity engaged
in for profit); Polakof v. Comm'r, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 1300, 1307 (1985) (partnership's acquisition
and distribution of four movies lacked a profit motive and was not an activity engaged in for
profit); Cronin v. Comm'r, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 805, 814 (1985) (partnership's acquisition and
distribution of a master recording not an activity engaged in for profit).
59. See supra notes 29.40 and accompanying text.
60. Deegan, 49 T.C.M. at 1429-30; Polakof, 49 T.C.M. at 1308 n.13; Cronin, 49 T.C.M.
at 815.
61. Sheid v. Comm'r, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 663, 669-70 (1985) (partnership business of owning
a movie constituted an activity engaged in for profit).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 670.
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Two recent cases, Fox v. Commissioner64 and Siegel v. Commissioner,6 5
highlight the difficulty and inherent ambiguity in applying the section 183
"not engaged in for profit" language. This Note examines the courts' use
of the nine regulation factors in an attempt to reconcile the conflicting
decisions. In a third case, Sheid v. Commissioner,66 this Note examines the
soundness of the court's decision to rely solely on the facts and circumstances
of the case.
A. Fox and Siegel
Fox v. Commissioner involved the activities of Resource Investments, a
corporation active in the organization of limited partnerships and the solic-
itation of affluent individuals to invest in them. Before its involvement with
J.W. Associates, Resource had focused on the organization of movie and
T.V.-documentary investments. Typically, Resource would organize a limited
partnership which would then make leveraged investments in Resource-rec-
ommended properties by using extensive nonrecourse financing. J.W. As-
sociates was a partnership set up by Resource to invest in the publishing
rights of "An Occult Guide to South America" by John Wilcock. 67 Resource
hoped to capitalize on Wilcock's success as a travel guide author68 and the
current fad for books on the occult.
In April of 1976 J.W. Associates purchased all rights, interests, and title
to An Occult Guide to South America.69 As consideration for the purchase
agreement, the partnership agreed to pay $600,000, $163,000 in cash and
$495,000 in a nonrecourse note 0.7 In return, the seller gave J.W. Associates
64. 80 T.C. 972 (1983).
65. 78 T.C. 659 (1982).
66. 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 663 (1985).
67. Fox, 80 T.C. at 978-79.
68. Id. at 979. Wilcock had previously authored or co-authored several books in the travel
field, including nine travel guides in the Arthur Fromme series of books and several TWA
Getaway Guides. Over the 10 years prior to 1986, the Arthur Fromme books Wilcock authored
or co-authored sold a total of several hundred thousand copies. In addition, Wilcock had
published "The Autobiography and Sex Life of Andy Warhol" and at least two editions of
"The Witches Almanac." Id. at 978.
69. J.W. Associates actually purchased the film from Laurel Tape and Film, Inc. Laurel
Tape and Film was the wholly owned subsidiary of a company controlled by George A. Romero.
Romero was also the general partner of J.W. Associates. Id. at 982.
70. With regard to the nonrecourse note, the contract stated:
Said note will be substantially in the form of Schedule "B" attached hereto; said
note will be secured by a purchase money security interest in the manuscript which
will be set forth in a security agreement of even date from Buyer to Seller
substantially in the form of Schedule "C" attached hereto; and said note will be
payable on August 1, 1986 with interest as hereinafter provided.
... It is understood and agreed that neither the Obligor nor any of its Partners
shall be personally liable in any way for a default of the note due August 1,
1986, or a default of this Agreement. If Buyer defaults, Buyer shall have no
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an appraisal which estimated the average potential revenues from the book
at $700,000.71
Immediately thereafter, Resource began soliciting various wealthy individ-
uals with their partnership offering. Resource distributed a private placement
memorandum attempting to sell fifty-five units of limited partnership interest
in J.W. Associates at $3,000 per unit. 2 The memo included an accountant's
projections of taxable income (or loss), cash flow, and net after-tax benefits
to the limited partners. 73 The memo estimated that sales of 800,000 to 1.3
million copies of An Occult Guide to South America would have to be
reached, depending upon the mix between hard-cover and soft-cover sales,
to pay off the nonrecourse note. 74 Later in the memo, however, the ac-
countant stated that there could be no "assurance that the books can be
marketed at all, at any price." ' There was, consequently, no assurance that
the limited partnership would earn any profits. 76 The memo did nonetheless
anticipate that "each Partner will be entitled to certain items of income tax
deduction and credit which may be used to offset other income for 1976
obligation whatsoever to return to Seller any proceeds previously received by
Buyer which exceed the portion of those proceeds which should have been paid
to Seller, in the first instance, i.e., 50% or 80% thereof.
Id. at 983-84. It should also be noted that there is an error in the contract. $163,000 plus
$495,000 equals $658,000; not $660,000.
71. Id. at 984.
72. Id. at 985-86.
73. Id. at 986. The accountant projected net after-tax benefits under three possible scenarios:(1) the book earns the partnership $10,000 of proceeds, (2) the book earns the partnership
$300,000 of proceeds, and (3) the book earns the partnership $1.2 million of proceeds. The
result of these projections, assuming a 50 percent tax bracket, is as follows:
Proceeds to After-Tax Benefits to 55 Units
Partnerships 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
$ 10,000 ........... $168,658 $83,888 $51,646 $23,063 $ 245
300,000 ........... $168,658 $81,465 $49,224 $49,224 $19,698
1,200,000 ........... $168,658 $72,645 $36,352 $36,776 $91,042
Another projection, on page 1 of the memorandum, showed that if only the initial 15,000








75. Id. The memo further stated that:
The Limited Partnership has no assurance of earning any profits or cash flow.
The Limited Partnership does anticipate, however, that each Partner will be
entitled to certain items of income tax deduction and credit which may be used
to offset other income for 1976 and subsequent years .... [N]or can there be
any assurance that the books can be marketed at all, at any price.
d. 76. Id.
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and subsequent years." '77 Stuart I. Fox purchased one unit in the limited
partnership.
Stein and Day, Inc., 7 was the distributor for the book. Its promotional
campaign focused on small advertisements in such publications as The New
York Times Book Review, the Village Voice, and The New York Arts
Journal. Ads were also placed in Publishers Weekly and Library Journal.
79
An initial review of the book was very favorable. 0 Despite all this, the
returns on the book were nominal.,"
On its 1976 tax return, J.W. Associates reported gross receipts of $4,859.82
It claimed $344,87383 in deductions, of which $329,000 was designated "am-
ortization deduction. 8 4 These figures resulted in a net loss of $340,014. On
its 1977, 1978, 1979, and 1980 tax forms, J.W. Associates reported net losses
of $171,524, $125,223, $62,017, and $868, respectively. The actual per unit
deduction that Fox received in 1976 was $6,059. The corresponding per unit
deductions amounted to $3,057 in 1977 and $2,229 in 1978.85
The Commissioner filed suit, alleging that none of the claimed losses were
deductible because the partnership's activity was not engaged in for profit
within the meaning of section 183. At the trial, Judge Nims set out the
analysis that he would employ in determining the "not engaged in for profit"
question, expressly mentioning the regulation's nine factors.8 6 The court
noted that several factors weighed in favor of Fox's assertion that the limited
partnership was being operated in a business-like fashion. First, the part-
nership had acquired a reputable distributor, Stein and Day, Inc., to assist.
in the marketing of the book.87 Second, although Wilcock was not a best-
77. Id.
78. Id. at 981. During the mid-1970s, Stein & Day, Inc., distributed approximately 100 new
titles each year. Id. at 980.
79. Id. at 989.
80. Id. The March, 1977 issue of High Times carried a favorable review of the book.
81. Id. at 989-90. The actual sales to and returns from the bookstores of An Occult Guide
to South America were as follows:
Gross Actual
Period Proceeds Returns
11/76-12/76 ..................................................... $3,044.54 $ 78.00
1/77-12/77 ..................................................... 1,056.09 1,365.65
1/78-12/78 ..................................................... 424.48 397.56
1/79-9/79 ...................................................... 1,043.94 58.95
Id.
82. Id. at 990.
83. Id. The deductions included a $2,000 accounting expense deduction, a $12,646 interest
expense deduction, a $1,227 "Distribution Commissions" deduction, and a $329,000 amorti-
zation deduction. Id.
84. Id. The partnership reported its amortizable property as "[blook rights, plates and
dies." The partnership claimed a $658,000 basis in these assets. Using the income forecast
method of accounting, the partnership deducted 50 percent of this basis for amortization. Id.
at 990-91.
85. Id. at 975, 990-91.
86. Id. at 1005-07.
87. Id. at 1008; see supra note 78.
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selling author, several of his books had sold well. s Unfortunately for Fox,
these were the only two factors that the court found to be in his favor.
Upon a "closer examination of J.W. Associates' conduct," 89 the court
found that the remaining factors did not support Fox's claim. The court
stressed that the size of the nonrecourse note was not determined by negoti-
ation, but rather determined unilaterally by Resource. ° The court also ques-
tioned the credibility of the appraisals given to the partnership by the seller
at the closing. Since the appraisals were furnished by the seller (Wilcock's
agent wrote one of them), the court concluded that a genuine profit-motivated
partnership would not have accepted them. 9' The court similarly questioned
the partnership's "true regard for the profitability of the activity" because
of the noticeable lack of arm's length negotiations. 92 The single most de-
terminative factor, however, was the private placement memorandum. The
court stressed that the substance of these letters, containing projections
involving the sale of only 15,000 books, was clear evidence that tax deduc-
tions were the sole motivation for participation in the J.W. Associates
partnership. 3
The court announced that based on all of the facts, Fox failed to meet
his burden of showing that J.W. Associates was engaged in its book pub-
lishing activity for profit. 94 The deductions claimed were accordingly limited
by the provisions of section 183.
In Siegel v. Commissioner,95 Charles H. Siegel purchased two units,
amounting to a 9.9% interest, in D.N. Company, a limited partnership
which was formed with the intent of purchasing and exploiting96 a movie
entitled "Dead of Night." '97 "Dead of Night" is a low budget horror film
involving a young soldier killed in combat in an area meant to remind the
viewer of Vietnam who then returns to his small home town as a zombie.
After killing a truck driver, a neighborhood dog, the family doctor, and an
old girlfriend, Andy climbs into a grave in a cemetery where he dies beneath
his own predated headstone. 98 Siegel had no expertise in the movie industry
88. See supra note 68.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1009. The court added that "[a]s long as the nonrecourse note was sufficiently
large in comparison to the cash portion of the purchase price such as to achieve anticipated
tax benefits, such benefits would make the limited partners essentially unconcerned about the
nominal aggregate purchase price." Id.
91. Id. at 1009-10.
92. Id. at 1010 (quoting Brannen v. Comm'r, 78 T.C. 471, 509 (1982), aff'd, 722 F.2d 695
(11th Cir. 1982)).
93. Fox, 80 T.C. at 1010-11.
94. Id. at 1013.
95. 78 T.C. 659 (1982).
96. Id. at 661-62.
97. Id. at 678-79. Prior to the completion of the film, it was referred to as "The Veteran,"
"The Night Walk," and "When Andy Comes Home." After the film entered distribution, it
was first titled "Dead of Night" and later "Deathdream." Id.
98. Id. at 678. John Marley and Lynn Carlin both received Academy Award nominations
for their roles in the film. Id.
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and had never viewed the film. Even though Siegel knew that the investment
was highly risky, he thought that the limited partnership had some profit
potential and would provide favorable tax benefits as well.Y
Another limited partnership venture, Maditax, Inc., was originally sup-
posed to purchase "Dead of Night" from David Perlmutter, president of
Quadrant Films, Limited, and producer of the film. The parties agreed to
a total purchase price of $1,000,000, $175,000 payable in cash and the balance
evidenced by a nonnegotiable nonrecourse promissory note.'°° The transac-
tion encountered several difficulties before the closing date, however, and
the sale was never completed.
Perlmutter than contacted Richard Bridges, general partner of D.N. Com-
pany. Their discussions led to the eventual purchase of "Dead of Night."
Under their agreement, the purchase price was only $900,000, $147,500
payable in cash and the balance of $752,500 represented by a nonnegotiable
nonrecourse promissory note secured only by the film itself.'10 The contract
entitled D.N. Company to receive a percentage of the film's gross receipts
in the United States and Europe'0 2 as well as a percentage of the profits
made from any television syndication.' 3
The film premiered in Tampa, Florida, and in a two-week span had
approximately eighty bookings."' 4 During this time period, however, the
European distributor of "Dead of Night," Europix, 105 was having financial
difficulties. D.N. Company consequently received no money from foreign
distribution of the film.
After its initial two-week premiere, "Dead of Night" had little commercial
success. The film underwent several title changes with the hope of increasing
audience response to the picture, but the efforts were unsuccessful. ,06 Bridges
also attempted to exploit the film by selling the television rights to a television
syndication, 0 7 but even this proved unprofitable.
On its U.S. Partnership Return of Income for the taxable year beginning
October 1, 1974, and ending December 31, 1974, D.N. Company claimed a
depreciable basis for the film "Dead of Night" of $900,000.'0 D.N. Com-
99. Id. at 662. Siegel received a document entitled "The D.N. Company Tax Recap for I
Unit" which stated that "in return for the purchase of one unit at $11,700, an investor could
expect to realize, assuming a tax bracket of 53 percent, total tax reductions of $21,513, or a
profit, resulting from the tax reduction over three years, of $9,813." Id.
100. Id. at 665. Mr. Perlmutter agreed to the $1,000,000 purchase price, $825,000 of which
was evidenced by a nonrecourse note, principally because "if the note were paid, [my] Canadian
investors in the film would receive twice as much as they had initially invested." Id.
101. Id. at 666.
102. Id. at 668.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 669-70.
105. Id. at 671; see supra text accompanying note 102.
106. Siegel, 78 T.C. at 674.
107. Id. at 875-76.
108. Id. at 680.
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pany also declared deductions totaling $210,779,09 of which $136,125 was
attributable to its depreciation deduction." 0 These figures resulted in a net
loss of $203,350. The pattern of net losses continued for the following four
years.'
On his 1974 tax return, Mr. Siegel claimed an investment in D.N. Company
of $89,100.112 Based on his investment in the company, Siegel claimed a loss
of $20,132 plus additional first-year depreciation of $2,000.'" For the 1975
and 1976 tax years, Siegel claimed losses from D.N. Company of $23,282
and $29,117, respectively." 4 The Commissioner challenged the deductions
attributable to the D.N. Company, alleging among other things that the
acquisition of the film "Dead of Night" was an activity not engaged in for
profit within the meaning of Code section 183 and that losses claimed by
the partnership were therefore disallowed."'
The court conceded that the case was an extremely difficult one, with
facts both supporting and contradicting Siegel's claim. The court stated that
when analyzing the nine factors listed in section 1.183-2(b) of the Income
Tax Regulations it would "proceed on a factor-by-factor basis mindful, of
course, that we will not simply add up the 'score' and determine the outcome,
but rather attempt to weigh all of the factors in reaching our ultimate
conclusion."" 6
The court's "ultimate conclusion" was that D.N. Company's purchase
and exploitation of "Dead of Night" was an activity engaged in for profit,
and thus the partnership was entitled to the deductions claimed under section
162 except to the extent otherwise not allowable." 7 Several factors led the
court to this decision. First, the court indicated that although the partner-
ship's general partner, Bridges, had little movie experience, the person he
hired to promote the film, Kilgore," 8 did. Kilgore's expertise in the movie
field thus gave the partnership the requisite air of professionalism. Second,
Bridges' business-like manner impressed the court, which interpreted his
constant letter writing and negotiating sessions as actions seeking to protect
the partnership interest.1 9
Finally, the court found that several unforeseeable independent events
contributed to the partnership's losses. °20 For example, it could not be fo-
109. Id.
110. Id. at 681.
111. Id. at 680. The net losses for 1975, 1976, 1977, and 1978 were $235,172, $311,033,
$41,537, and $49,068, respectively. Id.
112. Id. at 682.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 683.
116. Id. at 700.
117. Id. at 704-05.
118. Id. at 702.
119. Id. at 701.
120. Id. at 703.
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reseen that Europix would experience financial difficulties and be unable to
remit D.N. Company's share of the proceeds. The court additionally noted
that but for a critical oversight by Kilgore,' 2' the partnership would have
had more money available to inject into the promotional and advertising
stage of the film campaign. Lastly, the court suggested that the opening
scene of the movie, in which Andy is killed in a combat zone reminiscent
of the Vietnam war, probably "turned-off" a majority of the younger movie-
going audience. 22 The court concluded that while these factors did not totally
explain the partnership's losses, they did show that the partnership "was
off to a very poor start from which it never recovered" 1 2  and that there
were several independent factors working against the film.
The courts in both Fox and Siegel faced essentially the same question:
was the limited partnership engaged in an activity for profit or was it simply
a means by which the investor could realize substantial tax benefits through
avoidance and minimization? Both courts applied the "not engaged in for
profit" language of section 183, and both courts expressly took into account
the nine factors set out in the regulations. Yet even though the two cases
were very similar on their facts, each court reached a different result. This
is troubling not only from a fairness or equity standpoint, but also because
of the effect it could have on a tax system based on voluntary compliance . 24
The problem appears to lie in the lack of a clear judicial or legislative
standard, and particularly in the application of the nine factors found in
the Treasury Regulations. In theory, these factors provide the court with a
set of objective criteria which, when applied to a particular case, allows the
court to objectively ascertain the subjective intent of the taxpayer without
ever having to "get inside his head." While theoretically a plausible venture,
the problem is that the objective has not fully separated itself from the
subjective. While the factors may in and of themselves exist as objective
entities, the application of several of them necessitates subjective interpre-
tation on the part of the court. 25 The factors have not succeeded in erad-
121. Id. Kilgore spent $80,000 out of the $130,000 allotted for distribution of the film on
advance prints alone. This expense restricted the size of the promotional campaign. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 703-04.
124. Our tax system is a voluntary compliance system because each taxpayer voluntarily files
a tax return assessing income and amount of taxes due. Former Commissioner Egger argues
that openly touting abusive tax shelters as proper investments erodes public confidence in the
tax system and weakens voluntary compliance. Egger, supra note 3, at 1675. Egger estimates
that $75 to $80 billion a year in tax revenues are lost due to "normally law abiding citizens"
cheating on their tax returns. Tax Cheats, supra note 3, at 17, col. 1.
125. For example, there is no mathematically precise answer to the question of how one
operates in a business-like matter. Compare Churchman v. Comn'r, 68 T.C. 696, 702 (1977)
("Although she did not keep a complete set of books pertaining to her artistic activities,
petitioner kept all of the receipts for her art expenses and kept a journal recording what she
sold and to whom. These facts indicate ... a business-like manner [carried on] for profit.")
with Stanley v. Comm'r, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 516, 524 (1980) ("Although Mrs. Stanley kept
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icating the subjective from "not engaged in for profit" inquiries; they have
simply hidden it behind a veil of objectivity.
A re-examination of Fox and Siegel demonstrates the forced reliance on
subjective interpretation in the application of the nine regulation factors.
For example, the Siegel court looked favorably on Bridges' efforts to keep
the limited partners advised of what was happening with the movie. The
court interpreted Bridges' letters as showing good business sense, something
that someone actively engaged in making a profit would do. What the Siegel
court does not address, however, is that in each letter that Bridges wrote
to the partners he never failed to stress the tax benefits they would receive
from the movie venture. 26 Thus, although Bridges adhered to the requisite
form of a profit-motivated businessman, the substance of the letters leaves
the true intent of the partnership unclear.' 27
Several other elements common to each case were approached differently
by each court. First, in Fox the court regarded the lack of expertise of those
associated with the partnership as dispositive of whether the activity was
engaged in for profit. The fact that the partnership hired Stein and Day, a
well-established publishing and distribution firm, to aid in the exploitation
of the book had little effect on the court. In Siegel, the level of expertise
that Siegel 28 and his co-investors possessed was similar to that possessed by
the investors in the limited partnership in Fox. Unlike the court in Fox,
however, the Siegel court emphasized the qualities of the person hired by
the partnership to exploit the movie. After citing several of Kilgore's qual-
ifications, the court concluded that "Mr. Kilgore was basically a very en-
thusiastic individual."' '29 Again the court's subjectivity is called into play
during the application of the objective factors.
Second, the Fox court noted Fox's lack of expertise and general nonin-
volvement with the actual workings of the limited partnership and found
that Fox's actions reflected those of an investor solely interested in realizing
a tax profit. 30 By contrast, the court in Siegel never questioned Siegel's
motive for investing in the limited partnership. Had it done so, the court
would have found that Siegel, too, had no expertise in the movie industry,
that he did not become involved in the operational aspect of the limited
some records of her activities in a business like manner .... the 'trappings of a business' are
insufficient to demonstrate that an activity is carried on for profit.").
126. Siegel, 78 T.C. at 672-73.
127. The Fox court, by contrast, stressed the significance of the tax benefit information
contained within J.W. Associates' memorandum and letters: "The substance of these letters,
totally acquiesced in by the petitioners for all that appears in the record before us, are tantamount
to admissions by petitioners that unwarranted tax deductions solely motivated their participation
in the J.W. Associates partnership." Fox, 80 T.C. at 101l.
128. Prior to investing in the D.N. Company, Siegel had invested in two apartment projects,
one oil drilling venture, and a raw land investment. He had no movie experience. Siegel, 78
T.C. at 661.
129. Id. at 702.
130. Fox, 80 T.C. at 1012-13.
19871
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
partnership, and that he had been advised of the potential tax benefits before
he invested his money.
Third, the court in Fox indicated that the lack of "arm's length" nego-
tiation over the purchase price was indicative of a lack of a profit motive.",
In Siegel, however, the court did not question the propriety of the purchase
price, even though Perlmutter admittedly decided on the $825,000 nonre-
course note figure only because "if the note were paid, [my] Canadian
investors in the film would receive twice as much as they had initially
invested."13 2
Finally, the Fox court did not recognize any outside independent events
that might have influenced the profitability of J.W. Associates. 3  The Siegel
court, however, implied that but for the occurrence of any one of three
outside independent events-Europix's financial difficulties, Kilgore's "crit-
ical mistake," and the similarity of the opening scene of the movie to the
Vietnam War-the movie could have been a financial success.' 34
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, the nine factors do not greatly
aid the court in achieving any high degree of uniformity and objectivity in
deciding section 183 cases. A recent Tax Court case attempted to circumvent
the problems that arise when applying the nine factors. 35 In Sheid v. Com-
missioner, the court declined to base its decision on a factor-by-factor analysis




Harvey L. Sheid purchased a 3-1/3 percent interest in JHE Property Ltd.
(hereinafter JHE) for $10,000.131 JHE was formed by Edwin D. Abramson,
the sole general partner, for the purposes of acquiring and exploiting a film
entitled "The First Roman.' 31 8 The United States and Canadian rights to
the film were purchased by Allied Artists.139 Their agreement with the Euro-
pean producer of the film, CCC Filmkunst and Company, GMBH K.G.,
called for a purchase price of $1,200,000, $280,000 payable in cash and
$920,000 evidenced by a nonrecourse note, payable from twenty percent of
any proceeds that the distributor might collect.' ° During negotiations for
131. Id. at 1009.
132. Siegel, 78 T.C. at 665.
133. The factors that the court relied upon are set out at Fox, 80 T.C. at 1008-13.
134. Siegel, 78 T.C. at 703. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
135. Sheid v. Comm'r, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 663 (1985).
136. Id. at 670.
137. Id. at 665.
138. Id. at 664-65.
139. Id. at 666. "Allied was a distribution and production company which during 1971 and
1972 was classified as either the largest of the independent distribution companies or the smallest
of the majors." Id. at 665.




the film, Peter Strauss, executive vice president of Allied, estimated the "up-
side" potential of the movie to be approximately five million dollars. At
worst, Allied could recover the $280,000 cash investment from its eighty
percent share of the distributor gross.' 4'
Strauss approached Abramson 142 about the possibility of forming an in-
vestment group that would assume Allied's purchase understanding and
contract with Allied as the distributor. 43 Abramson was impressed with
"The First Roman" and asked for an estimate of the film's potential.
Abramson had never had any business dealings with Allied, but he was
aware of their reputation in the distribution field and was particularly im-
pressed that Allied was willing to take on the responsibilities of marketing
the film.' 44 Strauss later informed Abramson that he would estimate "tele-
vision sales at $800,000, nontheatrical and Canadian sales at $200,000, and
theatrical distribution film rentals at $2,750,000," totaling $3,750,000.14
Abramson also agreed with Strauss' perception of the film's mass appeal.
"The First Roman" was a "sandal and sword"' 146 type film. The popularity
of these films runs in cycles, and several have been very profitable. While
there had been several successful "sandal and sword" films in the late 1950's
and early 1960's, there had been none between then and the early 1970's.
Strauss felt that the time for another series of these films had arrived, and
both he and Abramson believed that much money could be made on a film
introduced at the beginning of the cycle. '41
The film opened in 1972 with disappointing results, and did no better in
1973. JHE's share of the film's revenue as reported on its 1972 tax form
was $206.50. Using the income forecast method of depreciation, the part-
nership's depreciation deduction came to $786,269.91 .148 The partnership's
distributive loss totaled $787,320.06,149 of which Sheid's respective share
equalled $226,217.75.11o The Commissioner challenged the amount of Sheid's
deduction attributable to JHE's loss.
In his opinion, Judge Whitaker stated that although a profit objective
may be analyzed in relation to the nine factors set out in section 183's
regulations, "those factors are not applicable or appropriate for every case.
The facts and circumstances remain the primary test.'"' The court then
141. Id.
142. Id. Abramson was a certified public accountant who specialized in doing work for
businesses in the entertainment field and for entertainers.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 666-67.
145. Id. at 667.
146. Id. at 666. The film was described as being similar to "David and Bathsheba," "The
Robe," "Solomon," and "Hercules."
147. Id. at 666-67.
148. Id. at 668.
149. Id.
150. $787,320.06 multiplied by 3-1/3 percent equals $26,217.75.
151. Sheid, 50 T.C.M. at 670.
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proceeded to evaluate certain facts that it considered dispositive of the profit
objective issue.
First, the court stressed that Allied had nothing to gain by marketing the
film solely as an abusive tax shelter." 2 While this might be true, the court
failed to address the benefit that JHE would realize by operating as a tax
shelter. For example, in its description of the facts the court made note of
a confidential JHE memorandum that described the terms of the offering,
the purchase price, and the tax consequences. 53 The court also mentioned
that several Allied internal documents described the arrangement as a "tax
shelter."'15 4 Without further explanation, however, the court concluded that
the realization of tax benefits was not the predominant objective of either
the general or the limited partners.'55 JHE acquired the film, the court ruled,
with a predominant profit objective.' 56
Second, the court was strongly influenced by Allied's expertise in the
movie distribution field. For example, the court decided that the analysis
and initial profit projections that Allied gave to Abramson were reasonable
because they were based on the "experience of knowledgeable persons."' 57
In the court's judgment, Abramson was perfectly justified in not seeking a
more formal and more objective appraisal. 51
Lastly, the court found that Allied and Abramson had bargained at arm's
length, despite the fact that Allied unilaterally set the purchase price with
respect to Abramson. 59 The court thus decided that the fair market value
of the film was its purchase price. In rejecting the Commissioner's argument
that a profit motive was negated by the fact that the price of the movie so
far exceeded its fair market value as to preclude JHE from making a profit,
the court stated that because of the arm's length negotiations, appraisal
testimony would have had little relevance. 6I
The court concluded that Abramson had conclusively established a good
faith profit intent, and that the partnership was therefore engaged in ex-
ploiting "The First Roman" with a predominant profit objective.' 6'
152. Id. at 669.
153. Id. at 667.
154. Id.
155. Id. The court stated that: "The fact that some employees of Allied may internally have
referred to JHE as a 'tax shelter' is irrelevant." Id. at 669, n.20. Contrast this attitude with
that seen in Fox, supra note 93.
156. Sheid, 50 T.C.M. at 669-70.
157. Id. at 670.
158. Id. But see Fox, 80 T.C. at 1009-10 (inconsistent with business-like conduct to have an
interested party furnish an appraisal).





C. The Lessons of Fox, Siegel, and Sheid
The Sheid decision sheds no more light on the problem of subjectivity in
the application of the section 183 regulations than did either Fox or Siegel.
Since the Sheid court declined to use section 183's regulations, it was not
constrained to make the objective inquiries that the regulations impose which,
as Fox and Siegel make evident, require determinations of subjective matters.
It failed, however, to articulate any type of an objective standard. Instead,
the Sheid court relied on its own intuition and discretion.
Neither Fox, Siegel, nor Sheid present a concise and unambiguous standard
by which a court can determine whether an activity is engaged in for profit.
Each decision turned on the particular court's subjective analysis of the
facts. Aside from the obvious problems involved with the application of any
subjective test, the most troubling feature of the three decisions is the
difference in their evaluation and interpretation of the same facts. For
example, the Fox court found the presence of tax benefit information in the
partnership's memorandum and subsequent letters as critical to its findings
that the partnership was not engaged in the activity for profit. 62 The Sheid
court, by contrast, downplayed the presence of the tax benefit information
contained in the partnership's memorandum, 63 and gave no weight to Allied
internal documents which described the arrangement as a "tax shelter."' 64
Another example involves the use of appraisals. The courts in both Fox and
Siegel refused to accept projections and valuations made by persons asso-
ciated with the transaction.' 65 In Sheid, however, the court accepted the
selling party's projection and valuation because the party's figure was based
on the "experience of knowledgeable persons."' 6
The conflicting standards and approaches used in the courts' decisions
result only in confusion and uncertainty among both taxpayers and courts.
As one commentator aptly put it: "Confusion and uncertainty about the
standard for the profit motive test and the situations to which it applies
have made it into a doctrine with great in terrorem effect that can be and
is invoked whenever a situation is too exploitative to suit the taste of a
court."'6 7 As Fox, Siegel, and Sheid make evident, which factor is given the
ultimate weight is often left to "intuitive judicial judgment."'' 61
162. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. But see Siegel, 78 T.C. at 672-74 (the court
ignored the presence of tax benefit information in a letter sent to the limited partners by the
general partner).
163. Sheid, 50 T.C.M. at 667.
164. Id.
165. Fox, 80 T.C. at 1009-10; Siegel, 78 T.C. at 689.
166. Sheid, 50 T.C.M. at 670.
167. Cooper, supra note 2, at 685.
168. Estate of Baron v. Comm'r, 83 T.C. 542, 559 (1984), aff'd, 798 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1986).
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IV. THE NEED FOR STATUTORY REFORM
Uncertainty and confusion over the application of the "not engaged in for
profit" criteria has produced both equity 69 and efficiency 70 problems. Only
two classes of people are likely to benefit from this uncertainty: those who
promote the shelters and those who invest in them.
The courts and the Internal Revenue Service aggressively apply the "not
engaged in for profit" test to distinguish between activities in which tax
deductions and credits will be recognized and those in which they will not.
The lack of a clear and concise standard, however, has greatly hindered
their efforts. In particular, the ambiguity in the application of the nine
factors found in the regulations to section 183 has led the courts farther
away from a clearly definable standard and closer to a more subjective,
more intuitive approach. Fox, Siegel, and Sheid reflect the inconsistencies
inherent in the application of section 183's regulations. A closer analysis of
the cases reveals, however, that the problem lies not as much in the appli-
cation of section 183 as in the section itself: the "not engaged in for profit"
test is simply not adequate to deal with the wide variety of tax shelter
schemes presently available.
In Fox, Siegel, and Shied, for example, it was the presence of nonrecourse
debt that generated the tax benefits that appealed to the investors. But for
the presence of the debt, it is doubtful that any of the three ventures would
have been as successful in attracting investors. Neither the two movies nor
the book, solely on their own artistic merit, had a legitimate chance at
making a real profit. Only when coupled with the leveraged debt'" was the
potential for a tax profit greatly magnified.'7 2
169. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has recently stated:
IT]he viability of our tax administration system depends to a great extent on
taxpayers' perceptions that the system is fair and equitable and is administered
in a fair but firm manner. When abusive, illegal, and fraudulent tax shelters are
openly touted as proper investments, public confidence in the tax system declines
rapidly, producing the likelihood of reduced revenues and voluntary compliance
and all that that implies.
Egger, supra note 3, at 1675.
170. In its simplest sense, abusive tax shelters are not efficient because they produce tax
benefits from investments that are, in economic terms, losing money. Prof. Cooper argues that
"[t]he existence of tax ... opportunities on levered transactions causes the law to encourage
investment in economically unsound ventures violating every efficiency objective, and it invites
transactions that undermine the equity of the system and create an impression of rampant
abuse." Cooper, supra note 2, at 714.
171. Professor Cooper states:
The basic, hard-core problem is leverage. Leverage is what moves transactions
from the intended exempt-equivalent stage to the better-than-exempt situation and
thereby raises serious efficiency problems .... Leverage is also what provides
"cheap," tax-subsidized access to tax benefits, which is so critical to making
gimmicky deals work.
Cooper, supra note 2, at 715-16.
172. See Note, supra note 3, at 435 n.27.
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In none of the above cases did the courts' application of the "not engaged
in for profit" test of section 183 account for the importance of the
leveraged debt to the overall profitability of the tax shelter. Ignoring the
presence of the nonrecourse debt and focusing primarily on the ability of a
shelter to generate a net profit figure does not adequately address the question
of true profit motive. In these situations, courts can do no more than attempt
to determine the subjective intent of the investor from the putatively objective
criteria found in the regulations. This invariably leads to the difficulties
encountered in the above cases, most notably those of defining a business-
like manner, valuation, and profit.
One commentator suggests that the key to combatting the tax shelter is
to focus on its use of leveraged debt and its economic consequences outside
of section 183. 17 This approach, however, would be only slightly more useful
than the analysis the courts presently employ. By making the presence of
debt in a tax shelter a "tenth" factor, the courts would benefit from an
expanded arsenal with which to combat tax abuse. Promulgating this as a
new factor, however, would also necessarily diminish its effectiveness. As
an additional factor, its application would be subject to the same vagaries
of judicial discretion noted in Fox and Siegel. Focusing on the presence of
debt, then, becomes but another stopgap measure in the catchup battle against
abusive tax shelters.
A more workable alternative to the "not engaged in for profit" dilemma
would be to rewrite section 183 so that it contains a rebuttable presumption
that the taxpayer is not engaged in an activity for profit. This approach has
three principle benefits. First, it substitutes judicial discretion for the will of
the legislature. Second, it is a more direct attack on potential taxpayer abuse.
Finally, it provides taxpayers and courts with a more clear, concise, and
workable rule. Giving the taxpayer an affirmative duty to prove that he was
engaged in an activity for profit will better prevent section 183 abuse because if
the taxpayer cannot carry his burden of proof, the activity will be presumed
to be not engaged in for profit and all tax benefits will be lost.
CONCLUSION
Uncertainty and ambiguity in the application of the section 183 "not
engaged in for profit" test has been a major factor in the recent proliferation
of abusive tax shelters. Today, neither the statutory framework nor the
court-manufactured legal standard has been able to sufficiently deal with
determining whether an activity is engaged in for profit. The Tax Court
attempted to remedy this in Sheid v. Commissioner by removing the court's
173. Cooper, supra note 2, at 717. Cooper suggests that a complete reform requires an attack
on all leverage since leveraged tax benefits are inherently abusive.
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reliance on the nine regulation factors. This approach, however, only begs
the question. Even if a court does not overtly rely on the regulation's nine
factors, it is still not clear what a taxpayer must show to arrive at the re-
quired profit motive. A more workable approach would be to structure
section 183 so that it contains a rebuttable presumption that the taxpayer
is not engaged in an activity for profit. This approach will be much easier
for courts to administer, will lessen taxpayer abuse, and will achieve a greater
degree of equity and efficiency for all.
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